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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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heir disinclination j;o agree with his suggestions. Churchill had found
among them only one politician, the ex-Premier Mikolajczyk (he had
referred to him as " the only light which burns for Poland in the im-
mediate future "), who might be induced to carry out under British
patronage the wishes of Russia. He was placing this gentleman in the
very dubious category of an agent of His Majesty's Government, and
thereby substantially decreasing his credit as a bona-fide independent
politician among his fellow-countrymen.
However, Churchill's praise of Mikolajczyk's  statesmanship ' proved
both premature and groundless,, for, although the latter, in his attempts
to find a compromise, had indeed gone beyond the limits of his power as
the Premier of Poland, he was by no means satisfying the Moscow rulers.
In an article published shortly after his resignation, Mikolajczyk explained
his personal opinion, quoting the terms under which he had presumed
Poland might have been able to arrive at an understanding with the Soviets.
And those terms were clearly contrary to the So\iet demands. First
and foremost they were directly opposed to the ensla\ ement of his country.
Mikolajczyk stated in his article that the Great Powers should not only
make the decision but accept the responsibility as well. They must agree
as to whether the problem of the frontiers was to be settled now or after
the war. The Eastern, Western and Northern frontiers should be defined
simultaneously. When the time came for the Big Three to take their
final decisions, then, at that moment, Poland must be guaranteed her
It was additionally evident from the statement published in the suc-
ceeding month by the Representatives of the Polish Peasants' Party (of
which Mikolajczyk was a member), strongly condemning the c Lublin
Committee/ that he was in fact still far from any co-operation with that
* Committee,' refeired to, even by Churchill himself, as " an institution
supported by the Soviets " but not as a responsible body representing
any section of the Polish people.
Churchill inferred moie than once that had they (the Poles) put their
signature to the  Curzon Line/ then the Soviets would not have instituted
the c Lublin Committee '; but it v/as a supposition supported exclusively
by its author's belief in the good-will of the Soviets . . . Had
Mikolajczyk's government been prepared to play the role of the ' Lublin
Committee,' and execute the orders of the Kremlin, Stalin either would
not have immediately placed a demand for the Eastern provinces of Poland
or else would have been very generous with his definition of the * Curzon
Line.' A case of a similar nature related to Carpathian Ruthenia, Soviet
propaganda had created an out-cry in January, 1944, that this country,
like certain others occupied by the Red Army, * wanted ' to belong to the
Soviet Union. When, however, Dr. Benes fell in with Moscow's designs,
no further reference for the time being, was made by the Soviets to the
t wishes * of the Carpathian Rutherdans.